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Recidivism, in clear and simple terms, is the inclination of a criminal to re-offend.

While tariffs are within the sovereign right of any country, the looseness by which the United States (US) applies them on the likes of Canada and Mexico suggests a definite loss of economic discipline.1

The current international trading system averages a tariff of 3 per cent across the board globally. Yet the US seems bent on imposing tariffs on friends and allies. Why?

First and foremost, the US, no longer, wants to be the first, for that matter, market of last resort. As and when the world wants to sell anything to the US, the latter wants it, only when it is Made in America.

This logic, of course, flies in the face of David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage and international trade.2 When the world gets down to trading with one another, invariably, through a complex web of trade relationships, such a process will bring down the prices of goods.

To President Donald Trump, however, who seems to regale in his role as the Group CEO of the American enterprise, this liberal commercial order is not operating to the advantage of the US.

In a more damning manner, Trump does not want the US to don this role anymore. One which has been shaped by the US at least since the end of World War I in 1918. Why?

That's because no institutions can seemingly protect the welfare of American workers.

Interestingly, Trump is not completely erroneous either.  The only institution to survive the end of the League of Nations (LON) in 1946 was the International Labour Organization (ILO).3

It was then followed by the resurrection of the United Nations (UN) in 1945. Notwithstanding the long history of ILO, in the mind of Trump, American blue-collar workers, have often been at the receiving end of globalization.

When America trades too much, jobs have slipped out of the sieve of the American economy. Through tariffs, US manufacturing and industrialization can return.

It doesn't matter that Trump is wrong. Jobs do not return to the US at the beck and call of the US president. The taste in the pudding is in the eating. The US workforce has to be resilient and skilled enough to trigger an industrial renaissance.

Since the US is unable to satisfy the most basic criteria of a good workforce, one that is driven by ever higher productivity in a world driven by electronic commerce, the US foreign policy is now an instrument of amortization.

Instead of using US foreign policy to defend its allies and friends, essentially its global interest, Trump has resorted to imposing tariffs on trading partners first.

Be that as it may, while the antics of Trump can be seen through the optic of the financialization of American foreign policy, even towards allies and friends in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is not a picture-perfect scenario.

It is not in the business of Trump to have the correct trade policy, though. By extension, the US foreign policy, which is driven by alliance maintenance and diplomacy, is now in disrepair.4

What Trump wants is for every country that wants to trade with the US to pony up. If this involves the onerous duty of forcing an ally or a friend to buy American defence equipment, so be it.

Hence, the Hub-and-Spokes security architecture built up by the US in the 1950s based on the San Francisco System are about to face one of its most stressful tests.5 Precisely, how much can one buy from the US to ensure that it remains in the good book of Trump?

That some of Trump's demands can be as exorbitant as they are unreasonably extortionist does not seem to matter.6

In the view of Trump, the world for far too long, has free ridden by the US hegemony. This is true irrespective of whether the whole process of free riding is measured from the benchmark of World War I or II; even throughout the first Cold War.

The US does not want to provide any security guarantee without something tangible in return.

In the plainest terms, the US is falling back into recidivism. The likes of which once manifested in how the US forced Japan to comply with the Plaza Accord in New York in 1985 and the "Managed Trade."7

Yet this strain of US foreign policy behaviour is not necessarily shocking. The privilege to return to its ostensible golden age is not necessarily the preserve of the US alone. Multiple civilizations have harboured the thought.

The Muslims are still longing for a return to the glorious era of the righteous Caliphs, potentially, the Abbasid and the Ottoman Empire.

From Homer’s Odyssey to the Chinese dynastic cycles and the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire, history offers a sobering reminder of how states, once great, fall into recidivism — a repeated pattern of self-inflicted decline. Invariably, a propensity to bend the rules to its favour time and again.

This cycle, where great powers retreat into a self-destructive loop, holds crucial lessons for ASEAN, especially as the global trade system is being fragmented by America’s ongoing tariff wars and strategic decoupling.

Homer’s Odyssey, for example, is not just an epic of adventure. Rather it is but a lesson in the dangers of hubris, vengeance, and the illusion of returning to a lost golden age.8

Odysseus, after his long journey, comes back to Ithaca only to find himself caught in a cycle of violence — slaughtering the suitors who had taken over his home.

Yet, Homer warns that this act does not restore Ithaca’s glory; rather, it invites further bloodshed.

As the goddess Athena steps in to enforce peace, one sees the underlying message: recidivist violence only leads to deeper entanglements, never to true greatness.

In the same way, MAGA’s attempt to "restore" American dominance through economic protectionism and geopolitical confrontation mirrors Odysseus’ futile attempt to reclaim an old order that no longer exists.9

The imposition of tariffs, the weaponization of trade, and the decoupling from global supply chains are akin to Odysseus slaughtering his enemies — acts that do not rebuild but instead prolong instability.

Chinese historical cycles, as recorded in the Shiji by Sima Qian and the Zizhi Tongjian by Sima Guang, further illustrate the dangers of recidivist thinking.10,11

The fall of dynasties was often precipitated by leaders who sought to return to a romanticized past, ignoring the realities of economic and social transformation.

The Ming Dynasty, for instance, attempted to restore the purist Confucian ideals of the past, closing itself off from trade and technological progress, which ultimately weakened its ability to respond to external threats like the Manchu invasion.12

The Eastern Roman Empire offers another telling example. Despite its longevity, Byzantium succumbed to its version of MAGA-style thinking—clinging to outdated military strategies, over-relying on mercantilist policies, and failing to modernize its defences.13

The empire sought to restore its former might by raising taxes and alienating allies, much like how the U.S. has engaged in economic warfare against China, Europe, and even ASEAN partners.

Thus, when Constantinople fell in 1453, it was not just due to Ottoman firepower but because of the empire’s internal decay, its failure to adapt, and its insistence on an outdated worldview.

The ongoing U.S.-Canada, indeed, the US-China tariff war, points to the fragmentation of global supply chains. When trust even among allies is thin, future trade is naturally thinner with potential adversaries too.

Put plainly, MAGA threatens to deepen global polarization further, potentially leading to a more devastating confrontation — one that ASEAN, at the heart of Indo-Pacific geopolitics, cannot afford to ignore.

The decay of international norms is evident in how trade agreements have been abandoned in favour of unilateral sanctions. Institutions like the WTO, designed to mediate economic disputes, are now sidelined. Now why must ASEAN be wary?

For ASEAN, the lessons from history are clear. The region’s economic growth has been built on trade liberalization, integration, and a delicate balance of geopolitical ties.

If ASEAN follows the path of protectionism, or worse, becomes collateral damage in the U.S.-China economic war, it risks being trapped in a cycle of stagnation and conflict.

ASEAN must resist the temptation to choose sides in the U.S.-China struggle. Instead, it should strengthen regional institutions, deepen intra-ASEAN trade, and champion multilateralism.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a step in the right direction, offering an alternative to the escalating tariff wars.14

Additionally, ASEAN should push for reforms in global trade mechanisms to counteract the increasing recidivism of protectionism.

The decline of great powers always follows a pattern — one of hubris, economic mismanagement, and military overreach.

As the U.S. and China edge toward further confrontation, ASEAN must heed the warnings from history and carve a path that prioritizes stability over alignment, adaptation over nostalgia, and cooperation over confrontation.

For ASEAN, the lesson is clear: history does not reward those who seek to restore the past but rather those who navigate the present with wisdom.

By learning from the failures of Odysseus, the Ming Dynasty, and Byzantium, ASEAN can avoid being drawn into the spiralling collapse of the international order. The time for strategic autonomy and regional resilience is now.

Footnotes:

1 Swanson, Ana. 2025. “Trump Announces ‘Reciprocal’ Tariffs across the Globe.” The New York Times, February 13, 2025. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/13/us/politics/trump-tariffs.html.

2 Watson, Matthew. 2017. “Historicising Ricardo’s Comparative Advantage Theory, Challenging the Normative Foundations of Liberal International Political Economy.” New Political Economy 22 (3): 257–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2016.1216535.

3 International Labour Organization. 2024. “History of the ILO | International Labour Organization.” Www.ilo.org. January 28, 2024. https://www.ilo.org/about-ilo/history-ilo.

4 Chivvis, Christopher S., Jennifer Kavanagh, Sahil Lauji, Adele Malle, Samuel Orloff, Stephen Wertheim, and Reid Wilcox. 2024. “Strategic Change in U.S. Foreign Policy.” Carnegieendowment.org. July 23, 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/07/strategic-change-us-foreign-policy?lang=en.

5 Izumikawa, Yasuhiro. 2020. “Network Connections and the Emergence of the Hub-And-Spokes Alliance System in East Asia.” International Security 45 (2): 7–50. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00389.

6 Lange, Jason, James Oliphant, and David Morgan. 2025. “Many Americans See Trump’s Actions on Economy as Too Erratic, Reuters/Ipsos Poll Finds.” Reuters, March 13, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/many-americans-see-trumps-actions-economy-too-erratic-reutersipsos-poll-finds-2025-03-12/.

7 Sheng, Wen. 2023. “US, a Master of Economic Coercion, Causes Growing Troubles for the World - Global Times.” Www.globaltimes.cn. May 21, 2023. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202305/1291091.shtml.

8 Blumberg, Naomi. 2023. “Odyssey | Epic by Homer.” In Encyclopædia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Odyssey-epic-by-Homer.

9 Haldar, Antara. 2025. “What Is MAGAnomics? The Economics behind Trump’s ‘America First.’” @Bsindia. Business Standard. February 14, 2025. https://www.business-standard.com/opinion/columns/what-is-maganomics-the-economics-behind-trump-s-america-first-125021402000_1.html.

10 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. 2018. “Shiji | Work by Sima Qian.” In Encyclopædia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shiji.

11 ———. 2025a. “Zizhi Tongjian | Work by Sima Guang | Britannica.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 2025. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Zizhi-tongjian.

12 ———. 2025b. “History of China - the Ming Dynasty | Britannica.” Www.britannica.com. February 11, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-China/The-Ming-dynasty.

13 ———. 2025c. “Byzantine Empire - Byzantine Decline and Subjection to Western Influences: 1025–1260.” Encyclopedia Britannica. February 17, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/place/Byzantine-Empire/Byzantine-decline-and-subjection-to-Western-influences-1025-1260.

14 ASEAN. 2024. “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).” Asean.org. 2024. https://asean.org/our-communities/economic-community/integration-with-global-economy/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership-rcep/.

Last Update: 06/04/2025