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For the second time in his political career, US President Donald Trump has triggered a self-made crisis he hopes to walk away from, this time by imposing a 90-day pause on his punishing tariffs – not to reverse his economic nationalism, but to let markets breathe, allies recover and adversaries panic.

In truth, this 90-day window is not a thaw. It is a vault. Trump has locked global trade inside it and tossed away the key.

The pause is set to expire on July 8 but there is no clear signal Trump will open that vault again. Like his previous policy spirals – on immigration, sanctions or pandemic responses – Trump is banking on chaos to generate leverage. The very notion of a pause implies negotiation, but Trump’s track record suggests something more troubling: he does not pause to recalibrate. He pauses to rearm.

And the world knows it. In Southeast Asian capitals, officials remain tight-lipped but deeply concerned. Trump’s tariffs have not been rolled back, merely the worst of it shelved. The so-called pause – which excludes China – offers no relief for strategic goods such as steel and aluminium products from Indonesia, Vietnam or even the Philippines, a long-standing US treaty ally.

Worse, the rhetoric from the Trump administration echoes the punitive language of the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act: punish friends, corner foes and force industrial reshoring at any cost.

This is not a reset – it is a hostage crisis for the global economy. Tariffs are being weaponised while diplomacy is reduced to theatre. Trump understands the choreography of coercion. By pausing tariffs instead of repealing them, he creates the illusion of flexibility while retaining coercive leverage. It is a classic Trump manoeuvre: appear conciliatory to lull markets into calm, while keeping a loaded gun on the negotiating table.

The victims are not just America’s rivals. The European Union is caught in the crossfire, especially with the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism colliding head-on with Trump’s “America first” industrial revival. Japan and South Korea are hedging every statement, weighing their options delicately to avoid becoming fresh targets.

Meanwhile, Trump’s principal demand remains unchanged: that US allies buy more, comply more and defer more. The 90 days are less a time for trade diplomacy than a countdown to surrender – on Washington’s terms.

For Southeast Asia, the implications are profound. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has never fully trusted great powers to behave predictably, which is why the Asean charter champions “regional resilience”. It is also why Asean signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and continues to pursue an EU-Asean free trade agreement. These are long-term hedges against precisely the kind of disruptions now emanating from Trump’s White House.

Yet Asean’s economic interdependence with the US – especially in electronics, garments, palm oil, semiconductors and machinery – makes it impossible to fully decouple. The bloc has benefited from American consumer markets and investment in logistics and digital infrastructure, but that reliance now looks like a liability.

Trump’s tariffs, rising global interest rates and an American push to “clean” internet networks of Chinese influence – which could exclude Asean’s digital frameworks given the collaborations with China – has left the region exposed. Asean members face a stark challenge: adapt or be sidelined.

What makes the 90-day pause so dangerous is that it extends the uncertainty. A clear policy, however harmful, can be prepared for. But a fluctuating pause keeps Asean economies in limbo. Yet the bloc has been restrained in its criticism, focusing instead on advancing trade regionalisation, not confrontation.

Asean is aware Trump may view criticism from smaller states as provocation. This is realpolitik: survive the storm, deepen resilience and hope for a reset in Washington – or at least an end to the chaos.

Crucially, Asean must recognise this is not simply about trade – it is about strategic leverage. Trump’s administration is blurring the lines between commerce and coercion. The US Indo-Pacific Command’s continued naval presence in the South China Sea underscores that tariffs are part of a broader power play. Hard power undergirds the soft language of trade. What’s being negotiated is not just market access – it is strategic compliance.

When the pause ends on July 8, there may be no consultations, no multilateral forums and no more allies. Trump may claim the silence of allies signifies consent. He may unpause tariffs without notice or escalate them to 200 per cent or more.

Presumably his advisers are working behind the scenes to devise a post-pause policy that solidifies America’s trade dominance by any means necessary. This may mean weaponising not only tariffs but also digital access, currency manipulation accusations, even maritime chokeholds. The potential for secondary sanctions on companies doing business with China – particularly in semiconductors, rare earths and green technology – cannot be dismissed.

In essence, Trump’s 90-day window is a policy vacuum masquerading as strategic patience. But once the clock runs out, he will not return with a key. He will come back with a crowbar and he will use it to force the world into his vision of economic obedience.

Asean must not be passive. It must redouble its efforts with the EU and Gulf Cooperation Council. It must align its digital economy frameworks with Japan and South Korea. And above all, it must remain committed to regionalisation, not as a slogan but as a lifeline.

For in Trump’s trade universe, there are no treaties – only terms. And terms, like keys, are kept by those who built the lock in the first place.

Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is professor of ASEAN studies at Islamic International University Malaysia (IIUM) and Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya. Yu-wai Vic Li is a lecturer in East Asian Studies at the University of Sheffield, the United Kingdom.

Article was first published in South China Morning Post on 27 April 2025.

Last Update: 28/04/2025