ASEAN's Inclusive Regionalism: Ambitious at Three Levels

Keywords: ASEAN, identity regionalism, inclusive regionalism, minilateral regionalism,  community-building, non-intervention, mousedeer diplomacy

As Australia prepares for the Special Commemorative Summit in March – marking the half century since Australia became ASEAN’s first Dialogue Partner – it is timely to take stock of the organization’s progress. Because international academic and media comment on ASEAN is often negative, it is especially important to note that ASEAN regionalism has been an ambitious project – and one offering advantages to Australia and others in the Indo-Pacific.
The organization has been accused of failing to solve all manner of practical issues - the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 1999 Timor upheaval, the current Myanmar turmoil, the continuing slash-and-burn haze ‘catastrophe’, and the struggle with China in the South China Sea. ASEAN is said to be “throttled by a policy prohibiting members from interfering in each other's affairs” (Graham 2002). Some even suggest the organization is “coming apart at the seams” (Vatikiotis 2023). As to ASEAN’s initiatives in promoting wider order in the Asian region, the multi-nation meeting of foreign ministers, the ASEAN Regional Forum, is often called a mere ‘talk-shop’ – and the East Asia Summit for heads-of-government is said to be unable to address key security concerns. One assessment has described the ASEAN-led architecture as a product of “design fault” – and suggests the need to “ponder new blueprints” (Gyngell 2015, 419). 

Some of this negative assessment gains support from insider analysts - and has the potential to stimulate sensible measures of reform. But there is also a view in Southeast Asia that the organization’s “implicitly Asian features” tend to be assessed “through Western lenses.” ASEAN is described as failing because it does not “conform to Western norms and aspire to Western objectives” (Bunn Negara 2017). Although Asia-centric/West-centric accusation can obscure rather than advance analysis, it makes sense to consider ‘Asian’ features of ASEAN regionalism – or, at least, to identify specific objectives which ASEAN leaders have set for themselves. 

Analysing Regionalism: distinctions, traditions, agency

A preliminary observation is that any form of regionalism needs to be analysed as architecture, not just as engineering. ASEAN regionalism emerged in an historical and cultural context and cannot be assessed merely in terms of ideal or deficient design. ASEAN also ought to be viewed as identity regionalism. It is concerned not only about multi-state, functional, cooperation – respecting security, economic, environmental, and other challenges. It attempts also to build an emotive commitment to regional community – including in the promotion of shared norms which can add substance to regional identity (Higgott 2007, 80, 83, 88; Wunderlich 2007, 142; Acharya 2009; Lee and Milner 2014: Abdul Rahman and Milner 2019).

A further distinction is that ASEAN regionalism emerges from the tradition of ‘Asia’ rather than ‘Pacific’ regionalism. ‘Pacific’ – or ‘Asia-Pacific’ or ‘Indo-Pacific’ – regionalism had its origins in the 1920s, when Asia was still under the domination of Western colonial powers. The different ‘Pacific’ endeavours in the post-colonial era – some supported by Asian states - always gave prominence to the United States. Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC, is an important example. ‘Asia’ regionalism has been more anti-colonial and anti-Western – and, also, more concerned than ‘Pacific’ regionalism about community-building and identity issues. 

From the late 19th century, Japanese and Indian intellectuals conceptualized an ‘Asia’ unity marked by a superior civilization. As the Western empires collapsed, the rhetoric of ‘Asia’ was highlighted at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947 and Sukarno’s Bandung Conference of 1955. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 damaged this Asia-wide movement – but even in the 1940s some in Southeast Asia were developing the vision of a step-by-step ‘Asia’ unity, starting with ‘Southeast Asia’. Burmese leader, Aung San (1915–47), who understood “the increasing universal interdependence of nations”, agreed there was a need to “rediscover our Asian destiny” - and contemplated a Southeast Asia “entity” that might one day be brought into a “bigger union with the participation of other parts of Asia as well” (Acharya 2012, 112-113).

These words convey the origins of ASEAN regionalism – but the commitment to community building is embedded in Southeast Asia’s political heritage. We see indications of emotive or organic regionalism when Malaysia’s post-Independence statesman, Ghazali Shafie, spoke of the Malay tendency to “gather together”, village-like (kampong-like) – to “berkampong”. He argued further that the well-known bamboo plant provides guidance - if not to humankind at least to Southeast Asia. A single bamboo plant, standing alone, can be easily broken by a gust of wind; growing in a protective cluster it is liable to be safe (Milner 2016, 21). The idea of ‘resilience’ was stressed especially by Indonesian strategists. It referred first to a nation’s economic and social development – and strength of national identity. Once such national resilience is achieved – according to Indonesian analyst Jusuf Wanandi - “regional resilience” can follow, “much the same way as a chain derives its overall strength from the strength of its constituent parts” (Wanandi 1984, 305).

The idea that Southeast Asian leaderships can exercise creative agency vis-à-vis the great nations of East and South Asia also has deep roots. These leaderships are used to operating in hierarchies, leveraging relationships with rising powers – not instinctively trying to balance against them. In pre-modern times, Malay writings sometimes compared small Southeast Asian states with the wily mousedeer, the small creature in Malay literature who uses his wits to out-manoeuvre larger animals. Singapore analyst Bilahari Kausikan captures the spirit of this mousedeer aspiration, and of much official documentation from ASEAN, when he writes that “one of ASEAN’s fundamental purposes is to maximise the agency of its members to preserve national autonomy among major power competition” (Kausikan 2020; see also Nazrin 2018; Natalegawa 2018: 158; Milner 2020).

ASEAN ambitions

The first ambition of Southeast Asian regionalism, forging a ‘Southeast Asia’ community, was challenging in that it meant confronting immense cultural and political diversity. Although China had long used ‘Nanyang’ and ‘Nanhai’ with reference to much of Southeast Asia – and Southeast Asians were sometimes referred to collectively as ‘people beneath the wind’ (people south of the typhoon belt) – the sense of ‘region’ was limited. Most of Southeast Asia did come under Indian cultural influence in the early centuries CE, but then the Mainland - with the exception of the expanding Confucian state, Vietnam - became a sphere of Theravada Buddhist kingdoms, and the Archipelago polities gradually joined the Muslim world. In the 19th and 20th centuries the region was divided into French, Dutch, United States and British spheres – each with its governmental and legal system. 

During the Second World War, both Japan and Britain treated Southeast Asia as a single region – and, at the 1947 New Delhi conference, some Southeast Asians sought to distinguish their interests not just from Western interests, but also from those of the large Asian powers. In that year a ‘South-East Asia League’ – perceived to be left-wing in orientation - was established in Bangkok. A decade later, Malaysian prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed an ‘Association of Southeast Asia’. Only Thailand and the Philippines could be convinced to join, and the organization was short-lived, but the Tunku spoke about seeking political stability for “all countries of South-East Asia” (Tarling 2006, 101). Such inclusivity – sustained by a willingness to ignore a country’s internal politics, and a preference for neutrality - was to be a characteristic of ASEAN regionalism.

ASEAN, established in 1967, was a decisive move in ‘Southeast Asia’ regionalism – asserting Southeast Asian agency at a time when the sharpening Cold War as well as the India-China conflict had hindered the progress of ‘Asia’ regionalism. A priority on community building was evident in the organization’s founding document, the Bangkok Declaration - which described ASEAN’s first “aim and purpose” as to “strengthen the foundation” for a “community of South-East Asian nations”. The theme of inclusivity – or at least tolerance of difference - was also affirmed in the stated determination to “preserve” the “national identities” of the different countries of Southeast Asia. 

Bringing together the original member countries of ASEAN – Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines – meant dealing with the range of tensions between these states. The commitment to inclusivity was even more important later, when incorporating the Communist states of Indochina – Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The first member countries of ASEAN had seen communism as interfering in their domestic affairs. But the organization’s insistence (in its 1971 ZOPFAN - Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration) that every state should have the right to lead its “national existence” free from “interference in its internal affairs …” also meant that differences in national political systems would not in themselves deter inter-state cooperation. 

This ASEAN injunction against intervention, as we noted at the outset, has attracted criticism – for instance, when the organization resists intervention in Myanmar. But it is integral to ASEAN inclusiveness. Similarly, ASEAN’s gradualist decision-making provokes frustration – especially from Western critics who favour decisive action. Such cautious processes, however, can help build a sense of ‘we-ness’ (Alagappa 2017, 111; Ba 2009, 37-40). Stressing ‘consultation and consensus’, in the words of one of the most experienced ASEAN officials, ensures that no party “will be ‘defeated’ since there is no voting”- and is thus “the key to ASEAN’s longevity and togetherness” (Termsak 2017, 81). In traditional Malay writing, the task of fostering consensus (muafakat) is sometimes viewed as bonding - people are said to become “united through muafakat” (Muhammad 2006, 74). Such bonding – even when deliberations fail to deliver a practical outcome – needs to be acknowledged when choosing criteria for assessing the effectiveness of ASEAN.

The second ambition

In the 1990s, while ASEAN was still being expanded across Southeast Asia, some ASEAN leaders took on Aung San’s second regionalist task – building a wider ‘Asia’, or at least ‘East Asia’, community. In mousedeer spirit, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir - famously uncomfortable with APEC - called for the creation of an East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) that would bring ASEAN together with the large states of Northeast Asia. Europeans, he said, “call themselves European” – so why must Asians be “told that we must call ourselves Pacific people?” (Milner 2016: 31; Lee 2008, 29). The proposal, resisted at first by Pacific regionalists, was implemented later in the decade as APT – or ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ (with ‘three’ being China, Japan and South Korea). 

APT is an action body – a project in ‘East Asia’ regionalism capable of winning respect from proponents of functionalist as well as identity regionalism. The APT’s formal statements highlight ‘East Asian community building’ – an obvious challenge, given the rivalries among the Northeast Asian state – and such identity aspirations benefit from the APT’s range of practical mechanisms, covering such areas as finance, transnational crime, tourism, health, labour, social welfare, energy, telecommunications, agriculture, and the environment.

Building the ASEAN community itself continued in the new century. An ‘ASEAN Charter’ was introduced in 2008, giving the organization a legal identity and enhancing its institutional machinery. Ambassadors could now be appointed to the ASEAN organization – and not merely to its member countries. Furthermore, in the spirit of identity (and organic) regionalism, the organization reaffirmed its commitment to “intensifying community building” and enhancing “regional resilience”. Like the original Bangkok Declaration, the Charter could not be more explicit about this priority. It also laid out plans for three types of ‘Community’: an ASEAN Economic Community; an ASEAN Political-Security Community; and an ASEAN Social-Cultural Community. In these and other ways, the Charter spelt out the aim to promote a “common ASEAN identity and a sense of belonging among its peoples ….” 

The third ambition

Apart from the ‘Southeast Asia’ and ‘East Asia’ community building, ASEAN has been exerting Southeast Asian agency in a third way - attempting to influence the wider regional order. The 1971 ZOPFAN Declaration was an early statement of ASEAN’s international perspective – calling for freedom from outside interference and declaring a preference for the “neutralization of South East Asia”. In 1976, ASEAN adopted the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, which restated the commitment against external interference – and insisted on settling disputes through “rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures.” Aimed at the promotion of “regional peace and stability”, the Treaty has gained 51 international signatures.

Gradually ASEAN attracted ‘Dialogue Partners’ – commencing with Australia in 1974 – and began to meet with them regularly. In 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was launched as a security organization for Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and today it has 27 members engaged in one way or another in the Indo-Pacific. As the name conveys, the ARF was designed as a security dialogue not a community-building initiative. Western participants hoped for more – especially a role in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution - and have also been frustrated by the ARF’s emphasis on consensus and non-binding agreements (Ba 2009, 231). On their part, Asian officials have accused Western participants of adopting a confrontational (and often futile) approach – and tend to favour careful diplomacy, hearing out different national perspectives, as a way to insure inclusivity. No such ‘forum’, it pays to reflect, existed in Europe in the lead up to the First World War.

Like the ARF, the East Asia Summit (EAS) – launched in 2005 and involving heads of government not Foreign Ministers – is also a forum, accused of being a ‘talk shop’. With participation from the United States and Russia, as well as Australia, it was not intended primarily to deliver practical outcomes or be preoccupied with promoting a regional identity. Some countries – especially from outside the APT – have called for functionalist action. The Chairman’s Statements from EAS meetings, however, continue to stress “constructive dialogue” in an “open, inclusive, transparent, and outward-looking forum”.  The bulk of the East Asian region’s practical business (finance, trade, development, and connectivity issues) is still handled in the APT - the East Asian body which comes closest to realizing longstanding aspirations for ‘Asia’ regionalism - or in ASEAN Plus-One meetings (especially with China or Japan).

Inclusive vs adversarial regionalism

With its ARF and EAS institutions, together with its Defence Ministers’ meeting (ADMM-Plus), ASEAN seeks to deliver on its early promise to “promote regional peace and security”. Determined to bring all voices to the table, ASEAN has established a track record in inclusive regionalism no other regional player can rival. It has been challenged, however, by a different type of regionalism. Over recent years, the QUAD – combining four democratic states (United States, Japan, Australia and India) and excluding China – has offered a minilateral, adversarial regionalism, with an ideological vision of a ‘free and open’ ‘Indo-Pacific’ region.   

ASEAN at first resisted the loaded term ‘Indo-Pacific’, but in 2019 – in a shrewd declaration, the ‘ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific’- altered its stance with a ‘killer amendment’. ASEAN now accepted the concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’ – but insisted it be redefined in inclusive terms. Having been long “engaged in the development of an inclusive regional architecture”, ASEAN argued that the ‘Indo-Pacific’ should be viewed as a “region of dialogue and cooperation instead of rivalry”. The Outlook also stressed ASEAN’s ongoing “centrality”, acting as “an honest broker within the strategic environment of competing interests”. 

The ASEAN Outlook, it turns out, has been influential as well as assertive. We hear less now of ideological ‘free and open’ and more of the term ‘inclusive’ – even in Australian, Japanese and United States statements. India has long favoured “free, open, inclusive”. Also, the Quad is being presented in a softer, less muscular way – highlighting “co-operation” (especially with ASEAN) on “global health, climate change, critical and emerging technology …” (Babones 2020; Milner 2023; Sharma 2023). Finally, and significantly, China has now expressed support for the ASEAN Outlook, with its Foreign Minister even beginning to use the term ‘Indo-Pacific” (Li 2022).  

What is the alternative to ASEAN-led regionalism? If ASEAN is not to lead, the process of choosing an alternative could exacerbate not soften regional rivalries. And what advantage can come from favouring adversarial over inclusive regionalism? For all its frustrations, ASEAN processes at least bring different sides into dialogue. 

ASEAN not ‘Western’ perspectives

The problem for ASEAN is that numerous elements in its distinctive diplomacy attract rapid condemnation when viewed in isolation. An assessment of ASEAN regionalism should first take account of the organization’s own core objectives. We have noted criticism of ‘non-intervention’ – but acknowledging the right of every state to its ‘national existence’ free from ‘interference in its internal affairs’ has been fundamental to ASEAN’s inclusivity. The reluctance of ASEAN states to rally with the United States against China in the South China Sea can frustrate Western strategists – but it is driven by the commitment to neutrality which also underpins inclusivity. Placing the unity of ASEAN above any other objective can impose a further limit on action. But it is a hard-headed assessment that positions the community-building priority – the determination to gather in a resilient, bamboo-like cluster – above a decisive response to a single, vital issue. ASEAN’s ‘consultation and consensus’, as we have noted, can irritate those favouring linear, outcome-focused processes – yet it is critical not only to ASEAN’s community-building, but also in maintaining dialogue with the whole range of major powers engaging with the region. 

ASEAN’s slow-moving political processes are a refrain in foreign newspaper commentary – but here we must remember that, by most Western standards, the region itself is anything but slow. A few decades ago, Australia’s GDP was larger than all the ASEAN countries combined – and even in recent times some commentators continue to refer to the region disparagingly as ‘Australia’s backyard’. The ASEAN GDP is now well over twice the Australian figure – even estimated in real GDP not Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. The ASEAN GDP is also larger than that of India – and about 85% of the Japan figure. 

A preference for quiet diplomacy makes it all the harder for observers to see the sheer ambition of ASEAN regionalism: the assertion of a mousedeer agency, first, in building a ‘Southeast Asia’ regional community; secondly, in promoting an ‘East Asia’ regional community; and then, thirdly, in working to advance an even wider - ‘Indo-Pacific’ – order, that is inclusive not adversarial. Moving beyond ‘Western norms’ to seek an insider perspective, we encounter a hierarchy of aspirations – a three-tier project with the potential to make ASEAN regionalism almost as striking as Southeast Asia’s economic vitality.   

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Astanah Abdul Aziz is an Ambassador in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. In 2024 she takes up appointment as Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN for the ASEAN Political-Security Community

Anthony Milner is Visiting Professor, Centre for ASEAN Regionalism, University of Malaya; Professorial Fellow, University of Melbourne; and Emeritus Professor, Australian National University.