Duterte surges as Marcos flags ahead of crucial midterm polls

As the Philippines heads toward pivotal midterm elections on May 12, a dramatic political shift is underway.

Once considered the crown prince of dynastic restoration, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr is now floundering, with his public approval rating plummeting from 42% in February to 25% in March, according to a Pulse Asia Research poll.

Meanwhile, Vice President Sara Duterte, daughter of the now-detained former strongman leader Rodrigo Duterte, is rising in the electorate’s eye, up from 52% in February to 59% in March, the same poll showed.

The arrest and extradition of Rodrigo Duterte to The Hague earlier this year on charges of crimes against humanity during his bloody war on drugs was a seismic moment in Philippine politics.

While many in the international community lauded the move as a step toward accountability for thousands of unpunished extrajudicial killings, its domestic reception has been mixed.

For many Filipinos, particularly in Mindanao and Duterte strongholds across the Visayas, the spectacle of a former president being tried abroad rather than at home has stirred nationalist resentment.

So far, it appears this Western international intervention, aided and abetted by Marcos Jr’s government, has bolstered, not weakened, Sara Duterte’s political standing.

She has deftly positioned herself as the inheritor of her father’s political mantle while avoiding his excesses. And the symbolism of her defending national sovereignty—by implication, if not explicitly—has endeared her to a Filipino public weary of foreign moralizing and elite Manila politics.

This puts the Marcos Jr administration in a bind. What was likely intended as a triumphant moment of legal reckoning has, in practice, sparked a backlash. In the eyes of many, the Hague trial is less about Rodrigo Duterte and more about a state that is increasingly perceived as unstable and externally manipulated.

The many reasons for Marcos Jr’s fading popularity are empirical and deeply felt on the ground. First, a cost-of-living crisis continues to batter ordinary Filipinos, with Rice, sugar, and basic utility prices all surging.

Despite lofty promises of ushering in a “golden age of agriculture,” Marcos—who controversially appointed himself as agriculture secretary—has wholly failed to tame inflation, curb smuggling cartels or ensure food security. His symbolic decision to consolidate executive and agricultural power, once seen as bold, now looks like a lost gamble.

Second, critics say the Marcos administration’s governance has become a masterclass in inertia. They argue Cabinet factionalism, elite-level indecision and growing policy contradictions have crippled the state’s response to mounting multiple crises.

The rollout of the Maharlika Investment Fund—touted as a vehicle for national development—has been derailed by concerns over corruption and political patronage. It has become emblematic of how the Marcos administration speaks of modernization while practicing corrupt old patterns.

Third, the Marcos family itself is showing signs of internal disarray. Senator Imee Marcos, the president’s sister, has publicly distanced herself from Marcos Jr’s key policies, including Maharlika and his overt foreign military alignment with the US over China.

Their family split has not gone unnoticed by provincial power brokers. More damaging, the narrative of Marcos exceptionalism—revived during the 2022 campaign—has begun to crumble under the weight of unmet expectations and unresolved historical grievances.

This loss of confidence is not confined to Metro Manila’s chattering classes. Across the Ilocos Region—once a Marcos bastion—local leaders are beginning to hedge their bets, with some quietly aligning with emerging camps loyal to Vice President Sara Duterte.

Her 58% approval rating, twice as high as Marcos Jr’s, is no fluke. While she shares the Duterte name, Sara has managed to distance herself from her father’s cruder populism, carving out a more pragmatic executive image rooted in her Davao mayoral years.

Unlike Marcos, Sara Duterte has avoided symbolic overreach. Her performance as Education Secretary—though criticized early on—has stabilized, with targeted investments in rural schools and curriculum reforms drawing quiet praise.

Her strength lies not just in competence but in emotional resonance. While Marcos projects elitism and nostalgia, Duterte offers something closer to everyday resolve.

Her Davao background and Mindanao base give her authenticity in a political landscape where central Luzon and Metro Manila elites often appear tone-deaf to provincial problems and struggles, especially among the poor.

The 2028 presidential election looms large over this month’s midterms. The Duterte camp is already positioning Sara as the natural successor to Marcos Jr, with a growing coalition of governors, mayors and legislators rallying to her side. By law, Marcos Jr is limited to one six-year term.

If her allies perform well in the midterms, Sara Duterte will not only control Congress but also command the political narrative heading into the next presidential race. In contrast, the Marcos Jr camp increasingly appears bereft of an overarching strategy.

Rumors of an Imee Marcos candidacy, which could be credibly crafted as different from her brother’s now floundering government, are already beginning to surface, with some suggesting a Marcos versus Duterte presidential duel is nearly inevitable in 2028.

If not, there is still a large clan of Marcoses to choose from if Imee doesn’t get the nod from her family.

This Marcos versus Duterte blood feud is more than personal: it is regional and ideological. The Marcos clan’s strength is concentrated in the north, especially Ilocos and parts of Luzon. The Dutertes, on the other hand, command the south, with deep support in Mindanao and the Visayas.

The two dynasties embody competing narratives of national identity and governance – one rooted in aristocratic restoration, the other in populist pragmatism.

And herein lies the simmering political tension. Unlike previous political rivalries that eventually gave way to fragile coalitions, the Marcos-Duterte conflict shows no signs of accommodation.

Their core constituencies are regionally insulated, emotionally committed and mutually distrustful. The rivalry is not merely electoral—it is generational, and possibly even existential.

Foreign actors, namely the US and China, are no longer peripheral, despite assumptions to the contrary. In early April, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief, General Romeo Brawner, publicly warned of alleged Chinese political interference.

Though specifics are lacking, the warning signaled a growing belief within the Philippine security establishment that the country’s internal divisions may be exploited by foreign powers—not least at this month’s mid-term elections. Marcos Jr is viewed as strongly aligned with the US and West, while the Dutertes lean toward China.

As such, the May 12 midterm elections will serve not only as a referendum on Marcos’s leadership but as a test of national resilience against both domestic fragmentation and foreign entanglement.

If Sara Duterte’s allies capture a majority in Congress and the Senate, the Marcos presidency could become a lame duck with a full three years to go.

If the Marcos camp suffers heavy electoral losses, it will mark not just a political miscalculation but perhaps the collapse of a dynasty’s dream of full rehabilitation. The stakes couldn’t be higher at the upcoming polls, where family, memory and vengeance will all factor in a crucial vote.

* Phar Kim Beng is Professor of ASEAN Studies at the International Islamic University Malaysia, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Asia Europe Institute.

** Article was first published in Asia Times on 2 May 2025.