Has the ASEAN Chair Become Too Powerful?

by Davit Hutt • The Diplomat

The noise surrounding Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s visit last week to Myanmar to meet with junta leader Min Aung Hlaing has been so deafening that any nuance is a whisper. Phil Robertson, of Human Rights Watch, called it “a slap in the face of the eight other ASEAN member states,” an apparent claim that the rest of the bloc was somehow united last year and that they opposed his visit. Perhaps this was the reason why the upcoming ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat, due to take place in Siem Reap next week, was called off on Thursday. Some allege other regional governments refused to travel in protest over Hun Sen’s Naypyidaw sojourn. The first real spike in Omicron infections in Cambodia is an alternative reason.

Another narrative now making the rounds contends that disinviting Hlaing from last October’s ASEAN Summit was an actual policy of courage and sustainability, and, indeed, something that gave ASEAN more leverage over the junta. That’s far from evident. And, as a corollary, this narrative holds that Hun Sen’s visit last week scuppered the bloc’s apparently tough-nosed consensus, whereas it’s probable that most regional states just want the Myanmar crisis off the agenda, regardless of the outcome.

However, the question rarely asked is why Hun Sen had the opportunity to unilaterally decide to make his visit in the first place –  to travel to Naypyidaw on behalf of the rest of ASEAN without having properly consulted his partners beforehand, except for a brief chat with Indonesian President Joko Widodo on January 4, which was held weeks after Hun Sen announced and planned his visit. Ahead of its assumption of the post, some pundits predicted a weak Cambodian chairmanship of the bloc. “[E]xpectations for Cambodia’s chairmanship are low… A failed or even stagnant Cambodian chairmanship will… accelerate ASEAN’s decline,” Charles Dunst wrote last November. What should have been of concern, however, was that Cambodia might stretch the power of the Chairmanship, using the post to advance its own interests, as I argued in this column last November.

According to the ASEAN Charter, a document that leaves so much open for interpretation, the annually-rotating chair is merely supposed to play host to what is essentially a gentleman’s club: to organize the two ASEAN summits that take place each year, to represent the bloc on the world stage (such as at G-20 meetings), and to arrange the numerous ministerial meetings between member states. However, Article 32, which describes the role of the chairman, leaves room for more. The chair is supposed to: “ensure an effective and timely response to urgent issues or crisis situations affecting ASEAN, including providing its good offices and such other arrangements to immediately address these concerns.” Even more broadly, Section (e) of this article states that the holder is to: “carry out such other tasks and functions as may be mandated.” In other words, Hun Sen could reasonably argue that his visit to Naypyidaw last week fulfilled this requirement.

Rahul Mishra, a prominent commentator on Southeast Asia, says the ASEAN chair “has turned more authoritative in recent years.” He told me, “Hun Sen’s decision to engage the Myanmar junta without any free and open consultation with fellow ASEAN members is just another symptom of this massive rot in the system.” However, he went on, Hun Sen isn’t the only one who deserves blame. “Other, comparatively more democratic, ASEAN chair countries in the past are also guilty of such a practice,” he noted.

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