Myanmar junta's ceasefire breach a show of desperation

Just days after a historic diplomatic initiative led by Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in his capacity as ASEAN’s rotational chairman, the ink on Myanmar’s latest ceasefire understanding had scarcely dried before it was shattered.

Once again, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s Tatmadaw launched fresh bombings, this time targeting Sagaing, the epicenter of a devastating 7.7-magnitude earthquake.

What was meant to be a humanitarian window has now become another chapter in Myanmar’s long tragedy — one written in the language of betrayal. But this betrayal, though deeply disheartening, is not ASEAN’s failure, least of all Anwar’s.

On the contrary, his courage to engage both Myanmar’s junta and the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) — a rare and politically risky maneuver — may yet prove a turning point.

Not because it brought peace in a matter of days, but because it exposed the true intransigence of the Tatmadaw and gave ASEAN’s diplomacy renewed clarity and legitimacy.

In this case, the signal is as clear as it is dangerous: the Tatmadaw is losing control of territory, coherence and trust — not just with international actors, but within its own chain of command.

This is especially true in Sagaing, long considered the symbolic and operational heart of the post-coup resistance movement.

For Min Aung Hlaing, allowing the resistance to fortify its grip on this region — even amid earthquake recovery efforts — is inconceivable. Hence, the bombings were not merely punitive; they were desperate.

And yet, in this bleak moment lies a paradoxical strength for ASEAN and Anwar. What Min Aung Hlaing’s betrayal has unwittingly done is to provide Anwar with greater political and moral capital — precisely at a moment when he prepares to preside over the landmark ASEAN + Gulf Cooperation Council and China Summit in late May 2025.

The collapse of the ceasefire serves as clear evidence that the status quo cannot hold, that neutrality without resolve is complicity and that collective ASEAN+ efforts must match the fragmentation occurring within Myanmar.

Anwar, having now dealt directly with both sides, is uniquely positioned to make the case to his fellow heads of state that the time for vague declarations has passed. Action must be decisive when both the junta and the ethno-nationalist organizations (ENOs) are at their weakest.

As Yohei Sasakawa, Japan’s Special Envoy on Myanmar who has patiently built bridges with ethnic armed groups for more than a decade, warned, “Trust is a finite resource. When one party repeatedly dishonors that trust, engagement must come with conditions.”

Sasakawa, once a symbol of quiet persistence, is now emblematic of a shifting tide: diplomacy must not merely observe, it must compel.

Moreover, as David Scott Mathieson —a leading independent Myanmar analyst — remarked in early 2025, “You cannot conduct diplomacy with a regime that mistakes dialogue for delay. The Tatmadaw is not listening — it is waiting.” And waiting, in this case, is a strategy of attrition against ASEAN’s political will.

Which is why Anwar’s dual-track diplomacy was not a failure — it was a strategic reveal. By initiating contact with both the junta and the NUG, Anwar has demonstrated that ASEAN can still convene, communicate and clarify, even when internal unity is tested and external expectations are high.

Now, with the ASEAN+GCC+China Summit approaching, Anwar can anchor regional consensus on three fronts:

1. That the disintegration of Myanmar is no longer hypothetical — it is underway.
2. That a spillover of armed conflict, human trafficking, digital slavery and statelessness into ASEAN and GCC regions is inevitable without coordinated intervention.
3. That only collective conditionality—not quiet diplomacy—can force behavioral change in Naypyidaw and among the ENOs.

Indeed, Myanmar’s fragmentation is creating zones of ungoverned territory along the borders with China, Thailand, India and Bangladesh.

These zones, if left unchecked, risk becoming platforms for illicit trade, proxy conflicts and humanitarian disaster — factors and threats that could easily draw in external power intervention.

ASEAN’s moment of resolve could inspire cross-regional alignment. And Anwar — standing on the foundation of his recent diplomatic engagement — can articulate this urgency with unparalleled credibility.

The time is now to push for:

1. Verifiable humanitarian corridors.
2. A regional contact group with teeth — including ASEAN, Japan, China and GCC members.
3. An end to impunity with documentation of ceasefire violations handed to UN mechanisms and international legal bodies for action.

The ceasefire breach in Sagaing is more than just another broken promise – it is a breaking point. And paradoxically, it offers Anwar and ASEAN the leverage they need — not to scold but to lead and strategize in a moment of regional crisis.

As Sasakawa Yohei once remarked, “Patience is not the same as passivity.” If Anwar can transform ASEAN’s decades of passive patience into proactive diplomacy — one shaped by conditionality and backed by partners — then the bombs falling on Sagaing will rightly redound on Naypyidaw.

Editor’s Note: This story corrects a previous published version that wrongly attributed a quote to International Crisis Group analyst Richard Horsey. We apologize to Mr. Horsey and ICG, and regret the mistake.

Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is professor of ASEAN studies at Islamic International University Malaysia (IIUM) and Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya.

Article was first published in Asia Times on 21 April 2025.