Myanmar’s historically catastrophic earthquake amid an ongoing civil war has placed the military regime led by coup-maker Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in a perilous and precarious position. Will the natural disaster, which hit the military enclave capital of Naypyidaw, Sagaing and Mandalay especially hard, lead to concomitant regime collapse?
Rebel groups have declared a ceasefire in quake-hit areas to allow aid to reach victims. As of Sunday (March 30), the military government said 2,928 bodies had been recovered, 3,408 had been injured and 139 were still missing. It’s anybody’s guess if these figures are understated to play down politically the impact of Friday’s tremblor, which reached 7.7 on the Richter scale.
Despite the announced ceasefire and the junta’s plea for international aid and assistance, which is now starting to trickle in from various nations, the regime reportedly sustained its aerial bombardments and shellings over the weekend, including an artillery attack on a hospital in Ponnagyun in an area held by Arakan Army rebels near the Rakhine state capital of Sittwe.
Those attacks amid an unprecedented disaster should be seen as a sign of weakness, not strength, however. Historically, when civil strife is compounded with natural calamities—earthquakes, floods, cyclones, and landslides—the junta’s vulnerabilities have been further exposed.
Indeed, natural disasters have played pivotal roles in shaping political transitions, particularly in fragile states with illegitimate or deeply contested governance structures.
In Myanmar’s case, environmental catastrophes have repeatedly exacerbated the structural weaknesses of various military regimes, rendering them even more susceptible to insurgencies, international scrutiny and domestic discontent.
And when the post-quake landscape emerges, rebels could quickly drop their partial ceasefire amid an unprecedented opportunity to move on a weakened regime with the military capital Naypyidaw and the main city of Yangon in their sights.
The concept of the “Mandate of Heaven,” deeply rooted in Confucian and Buddhist traditions, dictates that a ruler’s legitimacy is tied to their ability to govern effectively and ensure the well-being of their people.
In premodern China, dynastic rulers were believed to have lost their mandate when they failed to respond adequately to natural disasters, leading to their eventual downfall. Myanmar’s military, despite its secular and nationalist posture, cannot escape a similar perception among the nation’s deeply superstitious population.
Worldwide, natural disasters often expose the incompetence of authoritarian regimes. That’s especially been the case in Myanmar. In 2008, Cyclone Nargis devastated the nation, killing over 130,000 people. The then-ruling junta’s refusal to allow foreign humanitarian aid, fearing international scrutiny and even a possible US invasion, turned a natural disaster into a man-made tragedy.
The parallels today are eerily similar. The junta’s poor handling of previous relief efforts following floods, landslides and storms does not augur well for the victims and impacted survivors of Friday’s devastating earthquake. Unlike in 2008, however, today’s Myanmar is far more fragmented, with the military’s grip on power significantly weaker.
Authoritarian regimes thrive on opacity, and Myanmar’s junta is no exception. Over the decades, the military has controlled vast swathes of the economy through military-owned conglomerates such as Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC).
The flood of international humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disasters, however, increases external probity and oversight. The diversion of aid funds and resources into the hands of corrupt military officers and their business associates, as happened in the past, risks further eroding the regime’s already strained credibility.
Myanmar experts like Bertil Lintner and David Steinberg have long argued that various military regimes’ survival has depended on their ability to control the economy while suppressing dissent.
However, natural disasters act as natural disruptors, forcing the military to either engage with international relief agencies or risk alienating what little domestic support it retains. So far, the United States, European Union, China, Russia, India, South Korea and the UN have pledged to send humanitarian aid since the earthquake.
Transparency is an anathema to autocratic regimes, and as scrutiny increases, so does the risk of exposure. If humanitarian aid becomes a political tool that bypasses military channels, the junta’s control over key resources may weaken further.
The roads leading to Mandalay and Naypyidaw, Myanmar’s political and administrative nerve centers, have been severely affected by recent flooding and now the earthquake.
This infrastructural breakdown is a strategic boon for armed resistance groups, particularly the Three Brotherhood Alliance—comprising the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).
These groups have already demonstrated their ability to carry out well-coordinated offensives against Myanmar’s military, seen in their recent thumping battlefield victories and historic seizures of territory previously under regime control.
According to security expert Anthony Davis, guerrilla warfare thrives in environments where the mobility and supply lines of conventional armies are compromised.
The destruction of key roads will force the military to rely more on air power but with limited fuel supplies and mounting logistical challenges, air superiority may not be sustainable. Meanwhile, the resistance forces, deeply embedded within local populations and adaptable to rough terrain, have no doubt gained a new upper hand in many quake-hit areas.
The history of insurgencies in Southeast Asia demonstrates that when state forces are cut off from their supply lines, their ability to project power often disasterously diminishes. During the Vietnam War, the Ho Chi Minh Trail served as a critical artery for the Viet Cong, allowing them to outmaneuver and eventually outlast a far superior military force.
Similarly, Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups are adept at utilizing rugged terrain to their advantage, and recent natural disasters have strengthened their strategic positioning.
Autocratic regimes often maintain a façade of stability, even when cracks appear within. Myanmar’s junta has tried to project an image of control through military parades, diplomatic engagements and economic partnerships with countries like China and Russia.
However, the influx of foreign humanitarian assistance—often mediated through independent organizations—threatens this illusion. Humanitarian missions operate on principles of neutrality, but their presence invariably increases international oversight.
Scholars such as Mary Callahan argue that the influx of foreign aid workers and organizations often leads to greater external exposure of human rights violations.
In Myanmar, a new infusion of humanitarian aid and the presence of foreign aid workers could manifest in increased documentation of military abuses, from forced labor to war crimes.
Additionally, aid that bypasses military channels and reaches affected populations through local organizations—many of which have ties to or sympathy for the armed resistance—could further undermine the junta’s authority and battlefield position.
Moreover, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) increasingly divided over how to address the Myanmar crisis, external actors like the United Nations and the European Union may take a more direct role in providing assistance. (The closure of USAID will diminish America’s influence, though some US aid is on the cards.)
If foreign aid distribution is controlled by non-state actors, the military will struggle to maintain its hold over crucial resources, further weakening its leverage over many already disenfranchised local populations.
The overlapping crises of civil war and Friday’s earthquake disaster are pushing Myanmar’s junta into an increasingly untenable position. As regime leader Min Aung Hlaing grapples with maintaining control, his previous inability to respond effectively and equitably to disasters augurs ill for Myanmar’s post-quake response.
As foreign aid flows into the country, the military’s grip on key resources will weaken while at the same time exposing the regime’s deep structural flaws. Corruption, deprivation and infrastructural devastation could create a perfect storm, accelerating the junta’s decline and potential collapse.
And while the timeline of the junta’s possible fall remains uncertain, the trajectory is clear: Myanmar’s military dictatorship is running short on time and credibility amid widespread desperation and suffering while its armed and unarmed adversaries are growing stronger by the day.
Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is professor of ASEAN studies at Islamic International University Malaysia (IIUM) and senior research fellow, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya
Article was first published at the Asia Times on 31 March 2025.
Last Update: 06/04/2025